Good intentions will not fix Vermont.

Every bill is listed, with its official record, in Sen. Ruth Hardy’s record in review.

The short version

Vermonters have been clear about what is wrong. It costs too much to live here, there are not enough homes, and property taxes keep climbing.

Problem 1: Not focused on the problems. Of the 233 Senate bills Sen. Hardy has sponsored or cosponsored since 2019, only 9 were aimed at the core issues facing Vermonters: housing, property taxes and schools, the workforce and the cost of living. None of those 9 made it easier to build a home or lowered anyone’s property taxes.¹

Problem 2: Not a careful steward of tax dollars. She cosponsored three new state programs, two of them the first of their kind in the country, and voted for the bills that committed $3,075,000 to them. Before each vote, state agencies, the Governor’s office or the fiscal office raised basic questions: Will it work here? What will it cost families? Does the state have the capacity? Will it hold up in court? The money was committed before those questions were answered.

The lesson is simple. Spend a little to find out first. Don’t commit millions to something that doesn’t work.

Problem 1: Not focused on the problems

Since 2019, Sen. Hardy has sponsored or cosponsored 233 Senate bills. We read the stated purpose of each one and asked whether it took on the problems Vermonters name most: housing supply, property taxes and school results, the workforce, and the cost of living.¹

The 9 were mostly workforce bills (help recruiting doctors, nurses, dental and social workers, and career-tech education), plus reading instruction, a health-care permitting change and a caregiver tax credit. The 29 touched the issues indirectly or for a small group: free tuition, small tax credits, health-care rules, car inspections. Bills she introduced herself included a Sister State Program (twice), a State House art and portrait committee, and a Vermont Libraries Day.¹

None of that is wrong in itself. But time, staff and money are limited. A legislator who puts them into three expensive experiments, and not into the costs Vermonters live with every day, has made a choice about priorities.

Problem 2: Not a careful steward of tax dollars

Three programs show the same pattern: money committed first, basic questions answered later, if at all.

A. The Clean Heat Standard (Act 18 of 2023)

What it was. A plan to have state regulators design a credit system for heating fuel. Fuel dealers would have had to pay for heat pumps, weatherization or cleaner fuels, or buy credits from someone who did. The cost would have been passed on in the price of every gallon of heating oil and propane.²

• The Governor’s office (Jan. 20, 2023): there was “no information on the fiscal impacts.” “A reasonable cost estimate is necessary.”⁴
• The Agency of Natural Resources (Jan. 26): the program “could initially raise the price of a gallon of heating fuel by 70-cents per gallon.” “We need to prove out what is envisioned in S.5.”⁵
• The Public Utility Commission, the agency that would run it (Feb. 14): with a single statewide delivery agent, “there is no need for a system of tradeable clean heat credits.”⁶
• The Public Service Department (Mar. 31, to a House committee): “Is this cost and complexity necessary to meet GWSA requirements?” (GWSA is the Global Warming Solutions Act, the state’s climate law.) It recommended that cost estimates “inform policy design” first.⁷
• The Governor’s veto letter (May 4), five days before her override vote: “the unknowns are too numerous.”⁸

Only $250,000 was for a study, and the study it paid for did not include a cost estimate.³³ $890,000 paid for six staff positions, and five of them were made permanent, for a program that might never be approved.² The Public Utility Commission had spent $829,838 by January 2025, more than its $825,000 share, and expected to spend about $395,000 more from carry-forward and reserve funds. More than $1.18 million is documented as spent across both agencies, not counting the Public Service Department’s staff.^9,10 Even the fiscal office’s final note, written after her votes, had no estimate of what the program would cost households.⁹

In January 2025 the Public Utility Commission reported that the program “is theoretically workable,” but that it “does not believe that this program is well suited to Vermont.” It found:

• The costs would be “regressive.”
• “The costs associated with developing a fluid trading platform for Vermont alone would far exceed the benefits … a simple administrative database could be constructed.”
• Vermont should build “upon existing programs rather than overlaying a new and complex regulatory structure.”
• “The Commission strongly recommends that the Legislature find an alternate way of achieving GWSA requirements in the thermal sector.”¹¹

The Legislature never authorized the program, and the Commission closed the case in January 2026.¹²

• Whether Vermont needed a new structure at all. In 2021 the same Commission had already told the Legislature that “Vermont already has the organizational structures, regulatory oversight, and experience to implement the programs we need.” The problem was funding. It had already proposed simpler options: a funding charge in 2019, and a fuel-tax increase for weatherization in 2021. In 2025 it said both “would be less complex and would have lower administrative costs.”¹¹
• Whether Vermont alone could support a credit market. The state already collects a per-gallon fuel tax from every retail heating-fuel seller, so a records request would have shown how few sellers there are. The Commission’s draft list of fuel importers who would owe credits later showed how concentrated the market was: the top two would owe about 20% each, the next 14 about 40%, and the last 70 about 18% (based on registration data the Commission said was incomplete).¹¹
• Who would owe the credits. The state already had the list of fuel sellers from the fuel tax. In 2025 the Commission said that defining who owes credits by that list would have been “less costly and more reliable.”¹¹
• Whether Vermont had to build its own credit system. Since 2017, Vermont had tracked renewable-energy credits in an existing regional registry instead of building its own.³⁴ A registry for heating credits already existed too; in 2025 the Commission priced it at $2,500 per user per year.^11,35
• Whether anyone else had made this work. As far as the record shows, no one had. Vermont’s was described as the first such law in the country.¹³

1. Vermont didn’t need a new structure. It needed money. Act 18 built a new regulatory structure. But in 2021 the Commission that would run it had already told the Legislature that Vermont had the structures it needed and lacked only funding. The act solved a problem the state did not have.¹¹
2. Without the credit market, it was an option Vermont already had, made more complicated. The credit market was the program’s defining feature. In February 2023 the Commission told the Senate committee that with a statewide delivery agent “there is no need for a system of tradeable clean heat credits.” Without the market, fuel dealers pay an agent to install heat pumps and weatherization: a per-gallon charge that funds efficiency work. The Commission had already proposed that, more simply, in 2019 and 2021.^6,11
3. Every family heating with oil or propane would pay, including the ones it promised to protect. The law says it “minimizes costs to customers” and prioritizes “customers with low income and moderate income.” But a charge on fuel sellers is paid through the price of every gallon, including by families who never get a heat pump. That took no study to see. The Agency of Natural Resources warned it could add 70¢ a gallon at the start; supporters disputed the size of that number, not that families would pay it.^2,5,36
4. The agencies that would have to run it doubted it. The Agency of Natural Resources said the idea had to be proved out. The Commission said that with a statewide delivery agent, the credit market wasn’t needed. The Governor’s office asked for a cost estimate, and the Public Service Department asked whether “this cost and complexity” was necessary. A program its own agencies doubt before passage rarely comes back with their recommendation. This one didn’t: in 2025 the Commission “strongly recommends that the Legislature find an alternate way.”^4,5,6,7,11
5. As far as the record shows, no one had done it before. Vermont would be first in the country, paying alone to design an untested program for about 200 fuel dealers (by the dealers’ own count) with no regional partner. The dealers warned: “Vermont should not go it alone.”^13,37

B. The environmental-justice map (Act 154 of 2022)

What it was. A law requiring the Agency of Natural Resources to build a Vermont-specific map of communities facing environmental burdens. It also set up a new council, agency plans and reports.¹⁴

• The Agency of Natural Resources (Feb. 17, 2022): “At least 17 states have developed mapping tools.”¹⁵
• The agency made the case for a Vermont tool (Mar. 14–16): national tools “do not appear to be well-suited” to Vermont communities.³⁸ After her vote, it told the House a new tool “can take 2-3 years.”¹⁸
• The law itself allowed the state to use existing tools, “such as EJSCREEN” (the federal tool) and the Vermont Social Vulnerability Index. Even so, it required a new Vermont map.¹⁴
• The fiscal office’s early estimate was $3 million and about 20 positions. It was cut to about $700,000 before passage.¹⁶

What it cost. $750,000 was committed: $500,000 for the map and outreach, and $250,000 for staff.¹⁴ The agency’s environmental-justice unit cost $322,342 in fiscal 2025. The agency says the unit also handles federal civil-rights duties.¹⁷

• The agency later told the House that “it can take 2-3 years to adopt a mapping tool.”¹⁸
• The map was due Jan. 1, 2025. The deadline was pushed to 2027, then to 2028.¹⁷
• $151,600 of the map money was still unspent as of early 2026.¹⁷

• Could Vermont adapt one of the existing tools?
• How long would a new one really take?
• What would the map be used for?

C. The Climate Superfund (Act 122 of 2024)

What it was. A law to charge large fossil-fuel companies for climate damage in Vermont. It made Vermont the first state in the country to pass one.²⁸ Before any money could come in, the state had to complete a cost study, a feasibility report and new rules.¹⁹

• The Attorney General’s office (Feb. 28, 2024): “there is legal risk associated with the bill.” The office also said it believed there were “sound, good-faith arguments” for it.²⁰
• The Agency of Natural Resources (Feb. 28): “ANR capacity to take on additional tasks … large or small – is completely exhausted.” It proposed a different “order of operations.”²¹
• Industry opponents (Feb. 14): the bill “may be unconstitutional” and “is preempted by federal law.”²²

What it cost. $600,000 was committed: $300,000 each to the agency and the Treasurer.¹⁹

• More money requested. The agencies have since asked for $1.2 million more, plus $300,000 a year.²³
• Legal fees. After the Senate vote, the fiscal office warned that “the State is likely to face substantial legal fees,” and that litigation “could drag on for years, especially if Vermont is the first state.”²⁴

• Two federal lawsuits are pending against Vermont’s law, one brought by the United States.²⁵
• New York’s similar law has been struck down twice.
  • The Northern District of New York ruled that it is preempted (Aug. 31, 2026).
  • The Southern District of New York ruled it unconstitutional under federal law (Sept. 23, 2026).²⁶
• No company has been billed, and no money has come in. In 2025 the Legislature gave the state another year: the cost study moved from January 2026 to January 2027, and the final rules from January 2027 to January 2028. Under the law, companies cannot be billed until six months after those rules are adopted.^29,30,31,32

• Would it survive in court?
• Did the agency have the staff to carry it out?
• Should Vermont act with other states rather than alone?

The Governor raised that last point when he let the bill become law without his signature.²⁷

The pattern, and a better way

The three programs share the same pattern:

• Each was built from scratch in Vermont, two of them as national firsts.
• Each came with warnings on the record before the vote.
• Each committed money before the basic questions were answered.

The questions were not hard. Most could have been answered in weeks, from documents and data the state already had:

What I will do. Before Vermont commits the money, I will ask the basic questions first:

• Will it work here?
• What will it cost families?
• Is there a cheaper way to find out?